A Police Ombudsman's report has concluded that the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) investigation into the Kingsmill massacre was significantly hampered by a lack of resources, contributing to a failure to arrest suspects identified by intelligence. The report, published today by Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Mrs Marie Anderson, acknowledged the immense pressure faced by RUC officers in 1976 while investigating the sectarian murders of ten Protestant men in County Armagh.

The atrocity, carried out by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) on 5 January 1976, saw a minibus carrying workers from Glenanne Mill stopped on the Kingsmill Road. One Catholic passenger was spared, while the remaining eleven men were shot multiple times, with only Alan Black surviving the attack. The murders were widely seen as a reprisal for loyalist paramilitary killings the previous day.

Mrs Anderson's report identified several critical failings in the original RUC investigation. These included the failure to arrest and interview eleven men who had been flagged by intelligence, and a failure to fully explore ballistic links between the Kingsmill weapons and other attacks. The investigation also suffered from missed opportunities and inadequacies in forensic analysis, fingerprint and palm print examination, and witness enquiries.

Despite these shortcomings, Mrs Anderson recognised the challenging circumstances faced by the initial police response. "Police officers who attended the scene immediately after the attack were faced with one of the worst terrorist incidents to occur in the Troubles and conducted themselves in a professional manner, identifying witnesses, recovering evidence, and conducting other enquiries in the area," she stated.

However, she was critical of the overall resources available to the investigation. "By today’s standards, the investigative resources available were wholly insufficient to deal with an enquiry the size of the Kingsmill investigation. The situation was exacerbated by a backdrop of multiple terrorist attacks in the South Armagh and South Down areas that stretched the already limited investigative resources available even further." Mrs Anderson noted that the lead detective had a core team of just eight officers, briefly supplemented by two regional crime squad teams. The Ombudsman's investigation highlighted that over 60 individuals were identified as suspects, with intelligence linking a number to the PIRA. While eleven arrests were made, all suspects were subsequently released without charge, having remained silent during interviews. The report detailed instances where planned arrests of other suspects were inexplicably cancelled and where no rationale was recorded for why certain individuals were arrested while others were not.

A significant finding concerned a palm print lifted from the hijacked Bedford minibus used by the gunmen. Although a match was eventually made to a suspect over 40 years later, the Ombudsman criticised the initial failure to compare the print against all identified suspects.

The report also pointed to a failure to fully explore ballistic links. The weapons used in the Kingsmill attack were linked to numerous other incidents, including 37 murders, yet the Ombudsman found no evidence that the Kingsmill investigation team sought to incorporate these linked attacks into their enquiries.

Further criticisms included the handling of a threatening phone call received by Glenanne Mill workers days before the attack, which was not adequately followed up after the murders. Gaps in witness enquiries were also identified, with key potential witnesses, including the driver of a red Mini who assisted the sole survivor, never traced.

Mrs Anderson also noted the absence of crucial documentation from the original investigation, including a full copy of the serious incident log and officers' notebooks, which hindered her ability to gain a complete understanding of the RUC's actions.

While acknowledging the lack of dedicated Family Liaison Officers at the time, the Ombudsman highlighted the distress caused to bereaved families by the absence of communication from the police.

In terms of intelligence, the report found no pre-incident information that could have prevented the attack. However, post-incident intelligence, including specific information naming individuals and suggesting the attack was planned, was not always acted upon effectively.

Addressing complaints of collusion, Mrs Anderson stated she was limited in her ability to form an evaluative view on such conduct following a recent court judgment. The report also found no evidence that military personnel were intentionally kept away from the scene or that any covert operations were ongoing at the time.

Concluding her report, Mrs Anderson stated, "My investigation has not seen any evidence that was available to the investigation team which would have led to the conviction of any person for the offences of murder and attempted murder." She echoed the Coroner's sentiment that intelligence, no matter how often repeated, does not constitute evidence admissible in court.